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Abstract
This paper explores three deception techniques which are widely used in political and product marketing. These
techniques are ‘deception by omission’, ‘deception by saturation’ and the use of ‘deception by spin’. These
techniques are newly analysed in the framework of the four canonical strategies of Information Warfare and
Shannon’s capacity and entropy theorems, and their respective strengths and weaknesses established. Specific
strategies for the defeat of these deception techniques are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Instances of deception in political and commercial product marketing are well documented and historically well
established, but to date have never been analysed in the framework of the four canonical strategies, in any detail.
Therefore no basis has existed for formally modeling these techniques in a mathematically supportable form
(Alterman, 2005; Kahn, 2006; Delamarter, 1986; Hagley, 2006).
The aim of this paper is scientific, and centered in the application of information theory. The paper is intended to
newly map the three deception techniques used most frequently in political and commercial product marketing
into models based upon the four canonical strategies of Information Warfare, and explore their characteristics
from the perspective of the four canonical strategies. The focus of this paper is on the mapping of these
techniques. It is not intended to survey deceptive political and commercial product marketing case studies, or
explore or comment on the history, motivation or ethics of such deceptions. Examples chosen have been done so
as they are well documented and provide clear instances of such deceptions. Some brief examples and case
studies are used to illustrate these deception techniques for readers who may lack a background in the
mathematics of information theory, specifically Shannon’s capacity and entropy theorems (Shannon, 1948).
This paper, by mapping techniques used in political and commercial product marketing into the four canonical
strategies, completes a body of work which has aimed to map all commonly arising deception techniques into the
four canonical strategies (Kopp 2003, 2005A, 2005B; Kopp and Mills, 2002).
The ‘classical’ theory of deception mostly predates the formal mathematical formulation of the theory of
Information Warfare. It has been recently mapped into the four canonical strategies (Borden, 1999; Kopp, 2000;
Kopp, 2005B). This mapping shows that the dominant technique used in military and strategic deceptions, and
propaganda deceptions where the attacker unilaterally controls the medium used for information distribution, is a
Corruption/Mimicry strategy, usually supported by Degradation/Denial strategy.
Definition: For the purpose of this paper, commercial product marketing is defined as the presentation of
information pertaining to products which is intended to compel a potential customer to select these products over
competing products. Deception in commercial product marketing is defined as the use of deception techniques to
achieve the aim of marketing the commercial product despite the limitations or unwanted characteristics of the
product in the perception of the potential customer.

Definition: Political marketing, for the purpose of this paper, is defined as the presentation of information
pertaining to policy decisions or actions by a political or government entity which is intended to compel the
population, the legislature or an organization to consent to a policy decision or action, despite the limitations or
unwanted characteristics of the policy decision or action in the perception of the population, the legislature or
the organization. Deception in political marketing is defined as the use of deception techniques to achieve the
aim of marketing policy decisions or actions despite the limitations or unwanted characteristics of these in the
perception of the population, the legislature or the organization.
Deception techniques demonstrably qualify as a biological survival mechanism (Kopp, Mills, 2002), evolved
specifically for the purpose of gaining an advantage in a survival game. If we consider political or commercial
product marketing as a competitive survival game between players, then this biological model maps directly into
the behaviours seen in marketing, where deception is used to aid survival in this instance of commercial or
political entities.
In mathematical terms, deception techniques are characteristically used to support a game, or more frequently a
higher order hypergame, played out between participants in the survival contest (Kopp, 2003).
Players of games or hypergames specifically employ Information Warfare strategies, including deception, to alter
an opponent's perception of the game to so gain an advantage. The player using deception aims to specifically
manipulate the opponent's game strategy by presenting deceptive information which alters the opponent's
hypergame model of the player's subgame.
Definition: The four canonical strategies of Information Warfare are defined thus (Kopp, 2003; 2006):
Degradation or Destruction [also Denial of Information], that is concealment and camouflage, or
stealth; Degradation or Destruction amounts to making the signal sufficiently noise-like, that a receiver
cannot discern its presence from that of the noise in the channel. We can further divide degradation
attacks into ‘active’ and ‘passive’, depending on whether the attacker generates the signal, or hides the
signal.
Corruption [also Deception and Mimicry], that is the insertion of intentionally misleading information;
corruption amounts to mimicking a known signal so well, that a receiver cannot distinguish the deceptive
signal from the real signal.
Denial [also Disruption and Destruction], that is the insertion of information which produces a
dysfunction inside the opponent’s system; alternately the outright destruction of the receiver subsystem;
Denial via disruption or destruction amounts to injecting so much noise into the channel, that the receiver
cannot demodulate the signal.
Denial [also Subversion] , that is insertion of information which triggers a self destructive process in the
opponent’s target system; Denial via subversion at the simplest level amounts to the diversion of the
thread of execution within a Turing machine, which maps on to the functional behaviour of the victim
system, i.e. surreptitiously flipping specific bits on the tape, to alter the behaviour of the victim Turing
machine.
These definitions are included for the benefit of readers who do not have prior familiarity with the four canonical
strategies.

DECEPTION IN POLITICAL AND PRODUCT MARKETING
As numerous examples over many centuries illustrate, the full spectrum of deception techniques has been used to
promote political agendas and to market products. The use of such techniques however became most prominent
during the twentieth century, with the advent of mass media as a distribution channel (Alterman, 2005; Kahn,
2006; Delamarter, 1986, Volpe, 1978; Beasey, 1973).
At the fundamental level deception techniques used for these purposes are designed to function within a specific
type of environment, within the constraints imposed by that environment. As noted previously, propaganda and
media deception techniques used in situations where the distribution channel can be controlled characteristically
map into Corruption/Mimicry strategies, most often supported by Degradation/Denial strategies, thus forming
compound strategies (Kopp, 2005A; 2005B).

Analysis of numerous case studies indicates that at the most fundamental level of canonical and compound
Information Warfare strategies and supporting techniques, internal propaganda aimed at a victim population is
indistinguishable from classical deception techniques employed in intelligence or military operations (Haswell,
1985). Instances of intelligence and internal propaganda deceptions are well detailed in (Holland, 2001),
(Fischer, 1999), (Grabo, 2000) and (Goebbels, 1934; 1938; 1940; 1943; 1944; 1944).
A prerequisite for the use of these techniques is that no or very few constraints exist upon the control of the
distribution channel. Typically, two scenarios exist for control of a distribution channel. The first is where the
channel is operated by the apparatus of state, the second is where the channel may be operated by a third party,
but the propaganda message is attractive for other reasons to the operator of the channel, who is prepared to
become a proxy for the attacker to otherwise benefit from the attack (Kopp, 2005A; 2005B).
More generally, control of the channel and unconstrained choices in the use of Corruption/Mimicry strategies
cannot be assumed, especially where legislation or ownership impose hard limits on how the channel can be
employed, and what types of messages can be transmitted.
In most developed nations untruthful statements, or application of a Corruption/Mimicry strategy in political or
product marketing are unlawful or present grounds for civil action. In Australia most such offences fall under
Section 52(1) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 Commonwealth, which prohibits engagement in conduct that is
misleading or deceptive, or is likely to mislead or deceive (ABS, 2006; ALII,2006). Therefore deception
techniques which avoid explicitly untruthful statements may be the only legally safe deception technique
available, and thus the only techniques which may be safely utilized by an attacker.
In Western democracies with active media, it is frequently difficult to impose control on the flow of information
or to effectively propagate deceptions which are easily proven to be such. Thus the most common deception
techniques employed are Deception by Omission, Deception by Saturation and Deception by Spin (Kopp, 2006).
All of these techniques are designed to create a misperception of reality by either excluding unpalatable facts,
or encouraging the victim to devalue or disregard unpalatable facts by accepting the ‘spin’ on the issue.

DECEPTION BY OMISSION
Deception by Omission is a form of Passive Degradation, the first canonical strategy. The attacker hides
information which would be unhelpful or deleterious in driving the victim of the deception to a specific
misperception of reality (Kopp, 2006).
In terms of Shannon’s model for channel capacity (Shannon, 1948):

C = W log2 (1 +

P
)
N

Where C is capacity, W bandwidth, P message or signal power, and N noise power, the unwanted message is
omitted and thus P→0 for unwanted information, reducing its contribution to channel capacity to zero.
Two assumptions are made in this model. The first is that the victim receiver can wholly understand and thus
decode the messages it receives, which may or may not be true in the general case. The second is that some
repeatable mapping exists between a message, background noise and the quantitative measures of P and N. This
paper does not aim to determine that mapping in the general case.
A basis for establishing such a mapping will lie in Shannon’s entropy theorem, which shows that a message with
an entirely predictable content has no information content (Shannon, 1948):

I ( m) = − log 2 ( p (m))

Where I(m) is the information content of the message, and p(m) the probability of the message arising. If p(m)
→1, inevitably I(m)→0, that is messages which are certain to arise tell the receiver nothing. If we define noise in
this channel as being those messages without useful content, from the receiver’s perspective, then a basis exists
for determining a mapping.
A prerequisite for Deception by Omission is that the victim has poor a priori knowledge or no a priori
knowledge or understanding of what the attacker is presenting to be a picture of reality. A misperception of
reality favourable to the attacker can be implanted if the victim can be induced to form a picture of reality based
only upon what the attacker presents. Hiding the existence of unwanted facts which interfere with the formation
of a desired picture of reality in the mind of the victim may or may not be easy to implement. Pertinent examples
in the political domain would include instances of adverse policy outcomes, adverse studies or reports on policy
outcomes, present or future, being suppressed or not disclosed to the public. In the marketing of commercial
products for consumers, or industrial clients, concealment is characteristically implemented by not disclosing
known problems or limitations in products, or adverse side effects the products may produce when used.
The best defence a potential victim of a Deception by Omission attack has is to ensure that multiple independent
channels are used to collect information. In this fashion outputs from multiple channels can be compared.
Where differences arise, these can be analysed to establish what information may have been omitted.
Deception by omission is a very popular technique in commercial product marketing and political marketing
since it permits attacks without resorting to making provably untruthful statements, that is Corruption. Over
recent decades regulatory or legislative measures have been adopted in most developed nations to force
disclosure of factual information on products or compliance with specific regulations or law. Nevertheless the
deception by omission technique is often successful due to laziness or incompetence on the part of a victim
population.
The first case study draws upon public evidence provided by the Australian Department of Defence to the
Canberra Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade as part of the Defence Annual
Review of 20022003, and is an instance of political deception (FADT, 2004).
The background to this evidence is that in 2003 the Australian Department of Defence opted to arbitrarily retire
the Australian F111 strike fighter fleet a decade earlier than planned for, having previously decided in 2002 to
acquire the Joint Strike Fighter as Australia’s future combat aircraft. In the context of Australian military
planning, historically such decisions were made on the basis of extensive analysis and study. Both the F111 and
Joint Strike Fighter decisions were made without prior analytical study, which resulted in intensive public
criticism of both decisions. In response to this criticism, the Australian Department of Defence made a wide
range of public statements and provided evidence to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence
and Trade.
Elements of that evidence present excellent examples of Deception by Omission, Deception by Saturation and
Deception by Spin, directed at the Committee, the Australian public, with the political aim of avoiding
parliamentary and public censure, and the Australian Department of Defence itself, the latter with the aim of
maintaining internal cohesion (FADT, 2003). While a study of deception objectives and self deception is not an
aim of this paper, this example presents an interesting case study insofar as the organization was effectively
damaging its own capability and credibility by pursuing this chosen course of action (Brumley, 2006).
Deception by Omission arises frequently. Repeated instances include:
1.
2.
3.

Avoidance of any discussion of material risks arising in the Joint Strike Fighter program, despite these
attracting a large volume of press globally (FADT, 2003).
Avoidance of any detailed discussion of the capabilities of the competing F-22 fighter, despite this
information being widely available in the public domain (FADT, 2003).
Avoidance of any discussion of the adverse consequences of early retirement of the F-111 aircraft,
despite these being extensively documented in the public domain (FADT, 2003).

4. Avoidance of any discussion of the capabilities of competing foreign aircraft being acquired across the

region and presenting a challenge to the Joint Strike Fighter, thus concealing its weaknesses (FADT,
2003).

Case studies of Deception by Omission in the commercial domain are also abundant. A good summary of
examples in the computer industry can be found in DeLamarter’s work, which presents and distills evidence
compiled during the US Justice Department antitrust suit against IBM (Delamarter, 1986; Hagley, 2006).
Deception by Omission arises frequently, primarily in instances where adverse limitations of vendor equipment,
or impending unavailability of products are not disclosed to the customer. This technique has become widely
adopted across the computer industry, in this author’s prior experience as a Chief Engineer, and is not unique to
IBM practice of that period.
A problem arising for attackers who repeatedly play a Deception by Omission strategy is that the victim
population will over time learn that this strategy is being played, and as a result become mistrustful of the
attacker. Nevertheless the Deception by Omission strategy remains widely used as the victim population is often
unwilling to invest the effort required to defend itself, especially in the procurement of commercially marketed
products.

DECEPTION BY SATURATION
Deception by Saturation arises in two forms, either as an Active Degradation attack, or a soft kill Denial by
Destruction attack. In executing a Deception by Saturation attack, the attacker will inundate the victim with
messages, most of which are redundant or irrelevant, with the aim of saturating the victim’s channel so the
victim cannot gather information which might contradict the attacker’s message. Even an alert victim who may
have the capacity to find valid messages embedded in a large volume of redundant messages may be effectively
attacked, if the victim does not have the available time to sort through all of the received messages.
As an Active Degradation attack, Deception by Saturation aims to hide unwanted information behind a deluge of
messages which have little or no information content. This technique is distinct from Deception by Omission as it
involves the active generation of messages with deceptive intent, whereas the former involves the omission of
messages, doing so with deceptive intent.

As stated earlier, Shannon’s entropy theorem shows that a message with an entirely predictable content has no
information content. Given I(m) is the information content of the message, and p(m) the probability of the
message arising, then where p(m) →1, inevitably I(m)→0, that is messages which are certain to arise tell the
receiver nothing.
In effect the messages used to implement the attack can be considered to be noise in the channel, devoid of
information content. Where the victim cannot successfully filter a message from the background noise, for
whatever reason, the capacity of the channel will degrade down to zero. In terms of Shannon’s model for
channel capacity (previously cited), the redundant or information free messages represent noise N and thus
N>>P resulting in C→0.
In the context of Deception by Saturation attacks, attacks in which the victim has the opportunity to receive and
decode every message in the channel, be they deceptive or real messages, must be classed as Active Degradation
attacks not unlike jamming of radiofrequency communications channels. In such attacks the attacker is
successful where the limitations of the victim’s receiver prevent the victim from separating real messages from
messages produced by the saturation attack.
The alternate form of this attack is one in which the victim does have the capability to distinguish the real
message from the redundant or information free messages but is unable to perform this operation in reasonable
time and thus fails to distinguish between the attacker’s message and the real message.

In terms of Shannon’s model for channel capacity this is a situation where the bandwidth of the channel is
inadequate to the problem, that is W << Wrequired. As a result the capacity available is not enough to carry the real
message and the attack succeeds. Attacks which compromise the available channel bandwidth rendering it
unusable are classified as soft kill Denial by Destruction attacks.
Deception by Saturation remains widely used in marketing of commercial and political products, primarily as
much of the victim population is unable or unwilling to invest the effort required to filter redundant or
information free messages from real messages. It is worth observing that trivial strategies for analysing the
veracity of messages, based on assumptions such as ‘messages which are more numerous must be somehow
more truthful’ provide attractive opportunities for attackers using this technique.
A good case study exists in the previously cited evidence presented to the Canberra Joint Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. Repeated instances include:
1.

2.

Superficial but lengthy descriptions of the desirable attributes of the Joint Strike Fighter, none of which
introduce any new information content (FADT, 2003; 2004).
Superficial but lengthy descriptions of the undesirable attributes, limitations or failings of the F-111,
devoid of actual substantiation (FADT, 2003; 2004).

Both of these examples are characterized by often very long discussions of the issue in question, using verbose
language and often unnecessary technical jargon, introduced in the knowledge that the target audience will need
to expend time in referencing the language and understanding the terms used, thus effecting a soft kill Denial by
Destruction attack.
This is a well crafted Deception by Saturation strategy, insofar as legislators, who were the primary targets of
these attacks, are more than often constrained in the time they have available for hearings, meetings and reading
of evidence. Since few legislators have the background knowledge and understanding required to rapidly filter
actual information content from the Deception by Saturation attack conducted in such a specialised area of
debate, the use of this strategy can be highly profitable. This also explains why this technique is commonly used
in bureaucratic deceptions aimed at legislators (FADT, 2006B).
A good summary of examples in the commercial domain can be found in the previously cited work by
DeLamarter, on the US Justice Department antitrust suit against IBM (Delamarter, 1986; Hagley, 2006).
Deception by Saturation is frequently used, and best represented by large volumes of marketing literature and
brochures which contain little actual technical content. The audience is presented thus with the task of sifting
through large volumes of material to extract a small volume of technical content which is actually required to
make a rational procurement decision, and constitutes information content in the sense of the entropy theorem.
This practice is also not unique to IBM during that period, in this author’s prior industry experience.
This technique is not covered by regulation or legislation. In commercial tendering, bid size limiting has been
used as an effective defence mechanism. By constraining the size of tender proposal documents, the victim
(client) can force the attacker (bidder) to maximise the ratio of P to N, within a constrained W.
In the most general sense, if a victim expects to be subjected to this regime of attack, prudent planning sees
sufficient resources allocated a priori to ensure that all messages can be read and understood properly in
reasonable time. This permits messages which are devoid of information content to be filtered and discarded.

DECEPTION BY SPIN
Deception by Spin is a form of Subversion attack, and is often used in a compound strategy supported by
Deception By Omission, or sometimes Deception By Saturation. A spin attack is based on the idea of presenting
an unpalatable or other acknowledged or accepted fact, but encouraging the victim to assess that fact from a
perspective which is less damaging to the attacker. The victim’s mechanism for critically assessing the
unpalatable fact is thus subverted. Other than this basic form of attack, an alternate form where the unwanted

reality is not connected with the victim’s assessment is also used. This designate the latter as an Indirect
Deception by Spin.
A trivial example of the basic form might be thus – “here is an fact which is true, but it isn’t really that bad
because of the following circumstances ….”, in which the explanation of ‘following circumstances’ compels the
victim to devalue the unwanted consequences of the unpalatable fact. The attacker presents ‘following
circumstances’ which may in themselves not be untruthful, but achieve a deceptive aim by altering the victim’s
interpretation of the message to the advantage of the attacker.
It is worth observing that a well executed spin attack is typically a compound strategy, in which the absence of
evidently untruthful message content amounts to the use of a supporting Corruption strategy to insert the
Subversion into the victim’s mind. Spin attacks, like deception by omission attacks, rely on the victim having
little or no a priori knowledge or understanding, and the victim not being prepared to critically analyse a
statement by the attacker. The use of spin attacks thus often relies on the trust of the victim, or victims who are
fearful of losing confidence in the attacker.
In information theoretical and information processing terms, Deception by Spin is a classical compound
Subversion attack which is targeted against the interpretation phase of the Orientation step in the victim’s
Observation Orientation Decision Action loop. As the victim uses its own internal processing resources to infer
false conclusions from the received message, the victim has been effectively subverted to an internal state which
is intended by the attacker (Brumley et al, 2006).
The most effective defence against basic spin attacks is to explore what is being presented as the ‘it is not so bad’
qualification or ‘following circumstances’ to find what adverse consequences may have been excluded,
concealed or otherwise deceptively denied to the victim. This defensive play will however require investment of
some effort to implement, and often such effort may be infeasible given available resources.
Spin attacks have been used widely in the political debate, but are also increasingly a feature of other public
debates, notably on environmental issues and consumer products. Mostly spin attacks are used where some
adverse reality which cannot be concealed by the attacker must be dealt with. Spin attacks can be highly effective
where the victim is not prepared to apply critical thought to analysing attackers’ messages. Spin attacks are not
covered by legislation or regulation, and unless supported by an explicit Corruption strategy, remain legal. As a
well crafted spin attack may comprise components which are all truthful in themselves, the attacker can defend
the use of the spin attack as not being deceptive when challenged.
A good case study exists in the previously cited evidence presented to the Canberra Joint Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. Instances of Deception by Spin are less frequent than Deception by
Omission and Deception by Saturation in this case study, most likely due to the additional effort required to
produce such a deception. Prominent instances include:

1. Repeated admissions of F-111 groundings due to faults and failures, which are consistently explained

2.

3.

4.

as ‘age related’. As detailed analysis of each instance shows these were the result of poor engineering
or planning, rather than age. The argument that age is the cause was intended to shift the manner in
which the audience interprets the admitted failures to shift responsibility away from poor engineering
or planning practices, and thus represents an excellent example of spin technique (FADT,2003).
The applicability of ‘throw weight’, a generalized measure of strike force potency, is explained to be
irrelevant for a variety of reasons, none of which are actually pertinent to the argument. This was
intended to compel the audience to devalue the negative conclusions of a ‘throw weight’ analysis of the
Defence position (FADT, 2003; 2004).
The inability of the Joint Strike Fighter to compete with the larger F-111 in bomb carriage capabilities
is explained to be irrelevant as future bombs will be smaller and lighter. As bomber potency scales with
the number of smart bombs carried, this argument is intended to deceptively lead the audience to
disregard the actual limitations of Joint Strike Fighter and is thus a spin attack (FADT,2003).
Projections of increased future F-111 operating costs, using irrelevant models and examples which do
not fit the maintenance regime incurring these costs. The models and examples are used to compel the
audience to disregard the reasons why these projections overstate the actual cost (FADT,2003).

The repeated and consistent use of techniques based upon Deception by Spin, Deception by Omission and
Deception by Saturation appears to be a feature of how the Australian Department of Defence produces many of
its documents and statements to the public and the parliament. All three techniques have been used repeatedly in
subsequent evidence and submissions (FADT, 2006A; 2006B).
In the commercial domain, well documented examples can be found in DeLamarter’s work. Deception by Spin is
less frequent than deception by the previous tow techniques. The best single case study is the widely used
practice of stimulating Fear Uncertainty and Doubt (FUD) in customers. The unwanted (by the attacker) impact
of a competing product is explained in terms of the competing product introducing risks to the customer’s
operation, and thus not presenting a credible alternative. This is a spin attack, insofar as the acknowledged reality
of a competing product is presented to be irrelevant for reasons which are essentially speculative, but play on the
victim’s anxieties (Delamarter, 1986).
Another rich and well documented source of case studies of Deception by Spin exists in the history of the public
relations industry (MPRW, 2006).
A good example is the 1934 ‘Green Ball’ campaign by Edward L. Bernays, who confronted with public rejection
of green coloured Lucky Strike cigarette packaging, sought to alter public views on the attractiveness of green
colouring by launching a prestigious charity ball at which all gowns worn were required to be green in colour.
This is a highly refined spin attack, in that the attacker’s agenda is wholly hidden (MPRW, 2006A).
Bernays later repeated this type of spin attack during the Philco Radio campaign, where a lack of affluent
consumer market penetration by radio receiver products was countered by the launching of a gala black tie event
at a prestigious Rockefeller Plaza gallery in New York (MPRW, 2006B).
Bernays pioneered the Indirect Deception by Spin attack, using the idea of separating the Subversion attack
proper from the adverse reality which the attacker is aiming to dispel, thus making defence against the spin
attack difficult to achieve. Unless the victim is in the position to backtrack the funding trail behind the public
relations campaign, it will be especially difficult to establish that a spin attack is in progress. This technique
avoids the weakness in most common spin attacks, where the adverse reality is visibly connected with the
argument as to why it is not important.
It is reasonable to expect that spin attacks will increase in use over time as they are easily defended when
challenged. Unless legislation is introduced which legally defines spin attacks and makes them unlawful, their
use will remain attractive to potential attackers.

CONCLUSIONS
This paper has analysed mass media political and commercial marketing deceptions used in developed nations in
the framework of the four canonical strategies of Information Warfare and Shannon’s capacity and entropy
theorems. These deceptions are characterised by the wide use of three techniques, Deception by Omission,
Deception by Saturation and Deception by Spin, usually employed as part of compound strategies.
The key feature of all three strategies at the level of the canonical IW strategies is that all three of these
techniques avoid the explicit use of the Corruption strategy, as it is often legislated against.
This paper has shown that Deception by Omission is a form of passive Degradation attack, the first canonical
strategy, and provides an original explanation of this in terms of Shannon’s capacity theorem .It has shown that
Deception by Saturation arises in two forms, the first as an Active Degradation attack, the second as a soft kill
Denial by Destruction attack. Both forms are explained in terms of Shannon’s capacity and entropy theorems, an
analysis unique to this paper. It has also shown that Deception by Spin is a form of Subversion attack, and
explained its relationship to supporting strategies, and the Orientation step of Boyd’s OODA loop, not analysed
in previous publications. Defensive techniques exist for all three of these strategies, but require preparation and
investment of resources or time on the part of a potential victim of such an attack.

Opportunities will exist for further research in relating in more detail these techniques to component phases of
the Orientation step in Boyd’s OODA loop, and in the refinement of defensive strategies. Statistical analysis of
case studies to determine frequencies of specific deception techniques could also be performed to determine
where effort in defensive technique should be best invested. Another area of productive future research will be in
further exploration of the relationship between message content and Shannon information.
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